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Mutuality and German Football – an Exemplar of Sustainable Sport 
Governance Structures? 
Abstract 
German football has been hailed as the ‘holy grail’ of sustainable governance structures by their 
European counterparts.  With laws favouring members’ associations, efficient nonprofit 
governance structures and sustainable financial regulations resulting in profitable leagues it 
seemed to warrant further investigation.  Focusing on the purest form of the members’ 
association model, an eingetragener Verein (e.V), this article provides unique case study 
insights into Hamburger SV (HSV) football club.  The main findings reveal supporter 
ownership is democratic, involving different actors, membership and advisory groups, who 
contribute to carrying out different governance functions.  However, HSV have experienced 
challenges to their business model, primarily due to financial constraints influencing the club’s 
competitive advantage.  Moreover, the ever-growing number of members has resulted in the 
dilution of the Supporters’ Club core philosophy.  The qualitative findings have been able to 
provide practical implications to the nonprofit governance literature in relation to multilevel 
governance structures and subsidiary Boards.   
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Mutuality and German Football – an Exemplar of Sustainable Sport Governance 
Structures? 
Introduction 
Ferkins and Shilbury (2012) state that one of the main influences affecting modern day sports 
organisations are the issues surrounding corporate governance.  These issues have come to 
fruition in recent times due to the transition of sports organisations from an amateur/volunteer 
structure to a more professionally managed entity catering for the needs of a more sophisticated 
sport marketplace.  Hassan and Hamil (2010) argue that until recently key stakeholders involved 
in the management of professional sport clubs have possessed a relatively straightforward 
understanding of corporate governance.  Essentially, this has meant that ‘professional sports 
clubs have remained under the ownership of private companies or mutual associations and that 
these entities appropriately reward athletes of varying abilities for their role in delivering a 
sporting product’ (Hassan & Hamil, 2010:344).  As a result, professional sports organisations 
have adopted governance systems, which deviate from normal business practices.   
Hassan and Hamil (2010) highlight that the key objective of most clubs still remains the 
achievement of ‘on-field success’ irrespective of the level of competition.  This pursuit of ‘on-
field success’ has seen many sports clubs adopting a business approach which has encouraged 
them to ‘live beyond their means.’  However, in the past this risky business strategy involved 
reasonably low financial stakes that did not affect the overall equilibrium within the sports 
industry and meant that the game followed a predictable course.  In recent times, the changes 
in sport management (e.g., the shift from a committee or council of representatives to a modern 
Board of Directors, the introduction of paid Executives, player payments, increased income and 
expenditure, media scrutiny and a wider range of stakeholders) have presented major strategic 
issues to those responsible for governing sport organisations.  Governance for many involved 
in the sport sector has been an invisible process something that occurs as a matter of course.  It 
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is not until an organisation encounters difficulty that the spotlight is focused on this aspect of 
sport management.  While the status and legitimacy of the group charged with governing the 
organisation remains the professionalisation of many sport organisations and has signalled 
significant change for the work of the Board in governing the organisation.  As a result there 
has been a plethora of academic research published on the role of a nonprofit Board responsible 
for a sports organisation (Enjolras, 2009; Hoye & Doherty, 2011;) governance implications 
working within this industry (Balduck, Van Rossem & Buelens, 2010; Farquhar, Machold & 
Ahmed, 2005;) and how to achieve organisational effectiveness through sustainable governance 
practices (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2012; Hoye & Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Sherry, 2010).  
Sport governance literature, especially in the last few years, addresses issues of practice.  In 
particular, it provides a deeper understanding of the relationship between volunteer Board 
members and the paid Executive in terms of shared leadership and perceived influence (Ferkins 
& Shilbury, 2012; Ward, Scanlon, Hines, 2013; Wilson, Plumley, Ramachandani, 2013).  There 
is consensus in the literature about the increasing centrality of the paid Executive in governance 
decision-making but some argue as to whether this is a positive or negative influence on 
organisational effectiveness (Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2010; Herman & Renz, 2008).  The 
motivation to serve on a Board and the needs of Board members sheds some light on the 
characteristics of people involved in such critical roles as do questions of Board structure and 
roles.  There are also connections that can be made between findings from the sport governance 
literature and the question of Board strategic capability (Wajeeh & Muneeza, 2012; Weitzner 
& Peridis, 2011;).  The research on shared leadership indicates diminishing responsibility for 
strategic development by the Board (Branston, Cowling & Sugden, 2006; Stone & Ostrower, 
2007; Vidovich & Currie, 2012).  The research on Board motivation suggests that in order for 
Board members to be active strategically their needs must be met in some way (Li & Srinivasan, 
2011; Pergola & Joseph, 2011).  From Brown and Guo’s (2010) work on role definition, there 
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is evidence to suggest that the strategic role of the Board is blurred between the Board and the 
Chief Executive.  While sport governance research has not directly considered the structure 
variable, other research on Board structure confirms the importance of the partnership between 
structure and strategy (Nezhina & Brudney, 2010).   
The aim of the article is to critically analyse governance structures within German supporter 
owned football clubs.   The paper is divided into three sections. First, the theoretical framework 
is introduced with a review of the literature relating to governance structures and members’ 
associations within the organisation of professional German football clubs. Second, the research 
methods employed are described and justified. Finally, the results are detailed along with a 
discussion of the findings, which is concluded by recommended future research. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Deutscher Fuβball-Bund (DFB), represents over 25,000 football clubs which have nearly 
seven million members amongst them (DFB, 2014 [online]). The 36 professional football clubs 
of the Bundesliga and Bundesliga 2 (equivalent to the English Premier League and the 
Nationwide Championship) have a combined membership of 1,000,000 and this number 
continues to increase (Kicker, 2014 [online]).  Structured as registered members’ associations 
(eingetragener Verein (e.V.)) football clubs in Germany are nonprofit organisations owned by 
their members.  Any revenue has to, by law, be reinvested back into the club.  Consequently, 
the status of football clubs in Germany as members' associations implies certain social 
characteristics that differentiate them from other types of organisations (Pilz et al., 2011). The 
first characteristic within a members' association is that people associate and pool resources to 
further their shared interests.  The second is that decisions are made and leaders are elected 
through democratic decision-making structures (‘one member, one vote’), which offers every 
member equal opportunities for participation and influence (Wajeeh & Muneeza, 2012).   
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During the past decade, German members' associations as well as football clubs in other 
European countries have been impacted by the commercialisation and professionalisation of 
the football industry (Neubauer, 2009).  The very nature of sport economics encourages 
financial investment by a club to improve their squad of players and back room staff to enhance 
sporting performance of the team (Frick, 2005). Consequently, clubs are interested in 
generating additional commercial revenue to boost playing budgets. Furthermore, making 
efficient management and investment decisions helps to make the best use of generated 
revenues.  Therefore, football clubs also aspire towards a professionalisation of the leadership 
and management control structures (Bauers, Lammert & Hovemann, 2013). While these 
interactions are widely accepted, criticism is expressed regarding a ‘hyper-commercialisation’ 
and total economic orientation, where economic arguments adopt an all-dominating role which 
impacts on social, traditional and cultural aspects which receive less attention (Giulianotti, 
2005). 
Consequently, the efficient institutional arrangement of football clubs has created controversial 
debate within the academic literature (Franck, 1995; 2000).   Franck (2010) identifies a dilution 
of property rights for members' associations, which can lead to an erosion of incentives offered. 
This may also cause a decrease in contribution, an inefficient usage of resources and insufficient 
control and leadership of the differing Boards and actors within these football clubs. In addition, 
he recognises disadvantages regarding the institutional possibilities to tap sources of finance 
(Franck & Dietl, 2007; Frick, 2005).  Moreover, Franck (2010) sees disadvantages for football 
clubs being run by members’ associations especially in comparison to football clubs with a 
single investor.  Dilger (2009) analyses how and why members' associations can be beneficial 
especially in a sporting context. One advantage is that members of a club act as an unintentional 
consumer cooperative, as they do not intend to generate profits through their engagement with 
the club, but through the achievement of sporting success and collective experience.  
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Sport-sociological and sport-political arguments are also relevant to the debate due to the non-
financial importance of football clubs for their members and the society (Vidovich & Currie, 
2012).   In this context some arguments have been mentioned by the German Football 
Association (DFB, 1999) within a paper of basic values, which forms the basis for the '50 + 1' 
rule (51% majority share must remain with the Supporters’). There, it is mentioned that a 
heteronomy of the professional football department of a football club and accordingly a 
heteronomy of the sporting competition (through investors) should be excluded to avoid a 
possible negative impact on the sporting competition.  Furthermore, a link between professional 
sport and grassroots sport needs to be preserved.  Since 1998, the German Football Association 
allowed clubs to ‘spin off’ their licenced professional team from the members' association into 
an external limited company to attract external investors (DFB, 1999).  Two practical arguments 
were put forward in favour of a ‘spin off’ and investor involvement. Firstly, a ‘spin off’ should 
enable more professional structures as corporate law and not civil law for members' associations 
is applicable. Secondly, a ‘spin off’ allows the selling of equity capital and the raising of funds 
(Dietl & Franck, 2008). However, the civil law for members' associations in Germany is very 
flexible and allows members' associations to build up professional structures (Adam, Lammert 
& Hovemann, 2014).  The selling of equity capital from a ‘spun off’ subsidiary company entails 
the waiving of future cash flows and voting rights.   
If the club decides to undertake a ‘spin off’, the legal form of the members' association does 
not lose its stature, as the '50 + 1' rule demands that a 50% plus 1 vote majority of voting rights 
must always belong to the members' association.  In the case of a ‘spin off’ and if the football 
club has external investor involvement, the members' association or parent club, in general 
remains the superordinate institution and private investors’ interests are always subordinate to 
those of the members (Adam, Lammert & Hovemann, 2014).  German civil law enforces a few 
minimum requirements for members' associations to meet, for example the existence of the two 
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institutional bodies of the General Meeting and the Board.  However, some members' 
associations have developed their own organisational structures beyond the legal requirements 
and have implemented voluntarily additional bodies, such as Supervisory Boards, Disciplinary 
Boards, Auditing Committees or Election Committees.  These additional internal structures 
have been implemented to strengthen the club’s governance mechanisms and become more 
professional (Müller, Lammert & Hovemann, 2012).  The ownership of a football club by its 
supporters has obvious attractions.  Through the principle of ‘one member, one vote’, members 
would have an equal say in important decisions, and could propose resolutions at general 
meetings of the club (Ward, Scanlon & Hines, 2013). The involvement of supporters would be 
reinforced through a mutual constitution, with no conflict of interest between owners and 
supporters (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012).   
RESEARCH METHOD 
Case Study 
The case study approach predicated the need to offer insights into the understanding of the 
phenomenon of supporter ownership of football clubs  in order to add to the body of knowledge.  
These insights included new meanings, confirming the researchers existing understanding 
and/or explained the reasons for the problem within supporter ownership of football clubs, 
illustrated the multilevel governance structures within a supporter owned football club and 
provided further generalisation and applicability (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2014).  
Within the academic field, there is a variety of definitions to explain the characteristics of a 
case study. Yin (1994) uses such terms as exploratory, descriptive and explanatory.  Whereas, 
Patton (2002) describes case studies as descriptive, interpretive and evaluative.  Stake (1995) 
describes case study categories as intrinsic, instrumental and collective.  Although the 
variations in case study design and application are complex and sometimes blend into each 
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other, Table 1 summarises some of the main distinctions in the use of application of case method 
according to each of the three basic ontologies. 
Table 1 - Key Features of Case Method Informed by Different Ontologies 
 
 Realist (Yin) Relativist (Eisenhardt) Constructionist (Stake) 
Design Prior Flexible Emergent 
Sample Upto 30 4-10 1 or more 
Analysis Across Both Within case 
Theory Testing Generation Action 
 
(Source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2008:99) 
 
 
According to Skinner and Edwards (2005:418) the similarities of the terms may be grouped as 
such: 
 Intrinsic and Descriptive 
 Instrumental 
 Interpretive and Explanatory 
 Exploratory and Evaluative 
This research has taken the interpretive and explanatory route as the research objectives set 
were more about interpreting and theorising about the supporter ownership phenomenon.  This 
research has looked at the ‘why’ questions and, unlike a descriptive case study, has aimed to 
contain a greater level of analysis and conceptualisation in the final findings.  For the purpose 
of this study the researchers focused on the ‘German model’ with specific reference to a club 
who operates as an eingetragener Verein or (e.V). These registered members' associations were 
the only way which clubs were allowed to structure themselves prior to reforms made in 1998, 
which as a response to the increasing commercialisation of European football, allowed the 
professional football divisions of clubs to be run as external limited companies. They are 
nonprofit organisations, owned by their members and managed under a strict principle of 
transparency by democratically elected representatives. All revenues generated are reinvested 
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in the club. Three clubs were identified - Hamburger SV (HSV), VfB Stuttgart, Schalke 04.  
Following contact to all three stated clubs from the researchers to visit, HSV were the only club 
to respond.  The findings identify common aspects of the ownership, control and governance 
structures within HSV and provide ‘rich data’ evidence on the mutual business model in football 
clubs (Cornforth, 2012). 
Data Collection Methods 
The methods of data collection employed for this research involved conducting semi-structured 
interviews with key personnel within HSV and completing an extensive secondary 
documentary analysis.  The key respondents from HSV were selected for interview by applying 
a purposive sampling technique (Yin, 2014).  This technique enabled the researcher to select 
interviewees purely on the basis that they would be able to provide information relevant to the 
research.  The Key respondents interviewed at HSV were:- 
 Andreas Birnmeyer, Managing Director of the Supporters Department (has been Head 
of the Department since 1992 when it became an integral part of the football club). 
 Jens Wegner, Elected Board Member on the Supervisory Board (has been a Board 
member for 8 years and elected three times by HSV’s members). 
 Oli Scheel, Elected Supporter Director who sits on the Club Board (has been an elected 
Supporter Director for 6 years and was responsible for members’ matters, also he was 
able to provide viewpoints from the Club Board whilst considering discretion regarding 
confidential information). 
The interview questions set to understand the macro and micro influences which impacted the 
ownership structure of the football club.  These sets of questions helped illustrate in further 
detail the circumstances leading up to a deeper involvement of supporters’ within the football 
club and identify the main reasons why a change of governance structures was deemed 
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necessary.  The literature review also highlighted that a substantial amount of research, which 
had been conducted in the nonprofit and sport governance field, had explored the role played 
by Board’s in the direction and running of the club.  This area formed the basis for the next 
series of questions (Ferkins, Shilbury & McDonald, 2005; Hoye & Doherty, 2011; Miller-
Milleson 2003).  Questions were specifically included to understand how the football clubs’ 
structured their Boards, implementation of their strategic plan and the instigation of good 
corporate governance practices within the organisation (Cornforth, 2012).  Each interview took 
two to three hours to complete and all took place at the club.  While it is difficult to generalise 
from one case study and assume that supporter ownership is applicable at all football clubs, the 
main objective is that the diversity of HSV would provide a robust examination of this 
phenomenon, especially in terms of the multifaceted governance structures adopted by the club. 
Data Analysis  
Following Corbin and Strauss’s (2008) and Yin’s (2014) approach to data analysis, the case has 
been written up as a ‘holistic and comprehensive narrative’.  Rather than supplying every detail, 
the research provides a summation of the key findings using the pattern matching approach. 
However, in accordance with Yin (2014) all data has been adequately documented to allow 
other researchers to follow the procedural and decision trail. This methodological rigor provides 
‘audibility’ to the final findings included in this article. The researchers immersed in the data 
from the case study through numerous readings of interview transcripts and secondary data, 
commenced data reduction through coding emerging themes and data interpretation before 
writing up the final analysis and discussion.  Once the data was analysed, the use of case study 
method allowed the researchers to classify, compare, and describe the findings in a more 
meaningful way.  Fereday (2006) notes that case studies allow for the classification into 
categories and the identification of interrelationships between these categories from the data 
acquired.  The interview transcripts were typed and categorised electronically and the verbatim 
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responses were uploaded onto the NVIVO software package.  The semi-structured interview 
transcripts were then cross-referenced with analysis of secondary documents.    
Secondary Documentary Analysis   
Yin (2014) listed six sources of evidence for data collection in the case study protocol;  
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and 
physical artefacts.  Documentary analysis was undertaken to review governance information of 
HSV before the researchers visited the club to interview.  These documents varied from annual 
reports, Board Meeting minutes, company policy documents, brochures and leaflets.  Data was 
then collated from these different documents sourced, to analyse the football clubs’ 
performance, corporate governance strategies and overall management of the organisation.  
This included HSV’s written evidence submitted in response to the UK’s Parliamentary 
Football Governance Inquiry in 2011 (HSV, 2011 [online]).  Newspaper reports on issues of 
compliance and governance focusing on HSV and the Bundesliga were used as a secondary 
source. HSV’s website and fan blogs were also studied.  Finally, the researchers became 
members of the football club and attended several supporters’ AGM’s and the recent EGM in 
May 2014.   
RESULTS 
This section provides a detailed insight into HSV’s ownership and governance structures.  The 
findings from HSV illustrates a brief history of the club and documents the macro and micro 
influences on the formation of the Department of Supporting Members (Supporters Club) 
within the members‘ association of HSV (also known as a Supporters’ Trust in the U.K.).  In 
addition, raising funds, governance structures and attracting membership are analysed.  
Commercial operations reviewing the club’s business strategy and alternative revenue streams 
have also been discussed.  This case study focuses on HSV’s business activities from when the 
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Supporters‘ Club became an integal part of the football club from August 1992 to July 2014.  
Main themes (using NVIVO) prominent from the primary and secondary research undertaken 
are used to draw out the key areas for consideration.   
Hamburger SV (HSV) 
People Power 
HSV was formed in 1887 and upon the foundation of Germany’s first professional league in 
1963, were one of sixteen clubs invited to participate in the first season, and have competed in 
the top flight ever since.  The club’s golden age took place between 1976-1987, during which 
time they won three Bundesliga titles and reached two European Cup finals, winning one in 
1983.  However, by the late 1980’s the club had stagnated, and the low point came in the 
1991/1992 season, finishing in 11th place.  Andreas Birnmeyer, Managing Director of the 
Supporters’ Department explained that ‘The foundation of the Supporters’ Club was a reaction 
of fans who wanted to be more involved in the governance side of the club, in addition to 
following the club and watching matches.  They wanted to participate in running the club and 
having their say. They wanted some sort of democratic aspect to their involvement.  Fans 
wanted to make their thoughts known by being active members to stop the culture of the club 
as ‘we decide what you do and you have to take it or leave it.’ (Interview, June 9, 2011). 
The club utilises and adheres to the ‘one member, one vote’ philosophy and do not have any 
shareholders within the business (no ‘spin off’ and no external investors).  However, it is 
important to note that this ‘one member, one vote’ does not mean that if one member has 
invested a €1000 then this member has a 1000 votes.  Instead of investing, each member pays 
a yearly membership fee which is currently €48 and through their membership subscriptions all 
have an equal say/vote in the football club.  This democratic structure has been implemented 
throughout the business.  Membership numbers and attracting as many fans as possible to 
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subscribe was of paramount importance for the Supporters’ Club at HSV.  HSV and its 
Supporters’ Club are very proud of their membership numbers and have managed to exceed 
average home attendance (75,000 members, average home attendance 55,000).  HSV’s 
Supporters’ Club have proactively and consistently focused on increasing and maintaining their 
membership since their formation in 1992.  As Jens Wagner, ex-Board Director of the 
Supervisory Board recalled ‘the idea was to bring the fans into the club so we could change the 
clubs’ political idealogy.  On one hand we are seen as a service to organise fans affairs, i.e. 
away trips, sports clubs that sort of thing and then on the other hand we are seen as a political 
organisation representing fans views on how the club was being run’ (Interview, June 9, 2011). 
Governance Structures 
HSV have a Supervisory Board and a Club Board with twelve Directors elected on the Trust 
Board and up to five Directors on the Club Board.  Elected Directors of the Supervisory Board 
have a term of four years but can have their position terminated within this time if they are not 
deemed to be fulfilling their role properly.  Andreas Birnmeyer highlighted that the Football 
Club have also instigated a policy within their election process so ‘these people are only elected 
for four years and every two years we elect 50% of them again.  It used to be one election every 
four years but we decided against this because it was possible that eight could be elected in one 
AGM and three coming from the Supporters’ Club (Amateur Sports and the Seniors) who are 
delegates on the Supervisory Board.  We could have a situation where all eleven are new and 
would not know how things are done’ (Interview, June 9, 2011).  This change of election process 
has enable the club to keep their Boards fresh by regularly evolving personnel.   
Table 2 illustrates that HSV have several smaller Boards who are responsible for different 
operational activities of the Football Club.  The Supervisory Board and Club Board meet every 
quarter for strategic planning unless an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) is called.  The 
14 
 
Club Board can make their own decisions and set their own strategy on what the playing budget 
is spent on (a maximum of €500,000) without the approval of the Supervisory Board.  Tensions 
between the Boards inevitably occur but as Andreas Birnmeyer notes ‘there is not as much in-
house fighting as there once was.  At one time there were clear divisions between the business 
side of the club and the more sustainable side of the club.  The business side would push for 
selling the club’s assets to receive private investment, the sustainable side would argue we 
haven’t won anything for 25 years, we can wait five more years.  Don’t forget the club is more 
important than success’ (Interview, June 9th, 2011).     
The Supervisory Board may call an EGM if they are unhappy or concerned about the strategic 
effectiveness of the Board of Directors.  Furthermore, if the Club Board wishes to change any 
of the statutes or working policies within the football business they need to seek approval from 
the Honorary Board as well as the Supervisory Board.  Oli Scheel, Director of Membership 
Affairs recollects when tensions were high between the two main Boards in 2005, ‘the Club 
Board wanted to challenge and ultimately change the structure within the football club to gain 
more private investment to spend on players.  On the request of the Club Board the club opened 
this proposal out to the members to utilise their ‘one member, one vote’.  The members 
overwhelmingly voted against the proposal with the majority happy to remain with the current 
structure even if this affected the football team’s on-pitch performances’ (Interview, June 9, 
2011).   
The Supervisory Board Directors are unpaid and rely on volunteers but the Club Board 
Directors are paid a salary and are employed as full time employees.  While the first are elected 
as mentioned above, the members of the Board of Directors are appointed by the Supervisory 
Board.  There is one exception to this rule, which relates to the Director of Membership Affairs.  
Directors who have volunteered to work on the Supervisory Board were either retired, 
employed or self-employed.   
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Table 2 – HSV Board Structures & Responsibilities 
Board Name              Main Responsibilities               Board Structure 
The General 
Meeting of 
Members 
 
 The meeting of members is the 
highest decision making body 
within the club.   
 To vote, you must have been a 
member for at least 6 months and 
aged of 18 or older.   
   
 The general meeting of 
members elects 8 of the 11 
members of the Supervisory 
Board.   
 They elect the members of the 
‘Honorary Board’ and the 
club’s internal auditors. 
The Honorary 
Board 
 These are 7 club members who 
are older than 35 and who have 
been members for a minimum of 
10 years.   
 They are elected directly by the 
General Meeting of Members.   
The Board of 
Seniors 
 
 The Board of Seniors, who 
consists of up to 7 members, 
leads the ‘Community of 
Seniors’.   
 The Board elects one delegate for 
the Supervisory Board 
 The Board are mainly 
concerned with maintaining 
image, tradition and unity 
within the club.   
 
Department of 
Supporting 
Members 
(Supporters’ 
Club) 
 
 The Department of Supporting 
Members has a Board of up to 
five members, which leads the 
Supporters’ Club and is elected at 
the department’s annual meeting.   
 The Supporters’ Club is mainly 
concerned with organising 
activities for its members. 
 The Supporters’ Club elects 
one delegate for the 
Supervisory Board.  
The Auditors 
 
 The Meeting of Members elects 
the two club’s internal auditors 
for a period of four years.   
 
 
 Bi-annually, they check the 
club’s accounting and report 
directly to the members. 
The Amateurs 
Board 
 
 The Amateurs Board is elected in 
the course of the annual meeting 
of all the HSV amateur sports 
departments.   
 
 They are responsible for all 
non-professional sports within 
the club.  The amateur 
departments elect one delegate 
for the Supervisory Board.   
 
The main limitation to voluntary Board members was the inability to dedicate enough time to 
the job due to commitments from their paid work or activities away from the club.  These extra 
curricular activities also made meeting up on a regular basis difficult due to time constraints. 
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As Jens highlighted ‘if you work on the Supervisory Board you need to be able to honour a part 
time unpaid  job within the club, which requires commitment, self-motivation and a real passion 
for HSV’ (Interview, June 9th, 2011).  The main benefits highlighted were the diverse range of 
skills the club has received from the volunteers who have worked for the club.  Furthermore, 
the club had successfully recruited ‘new blood’ onto their Board (primarily due to the club’s 
nomination/election process) who had been able to meet the evolving challenges as the business 
grew.  Andreas Birnmeyer stated ‘that the main advantage of having an independent voluntary 
Supervisory Board is that they are far more direct in their approach than they would be if they 
were paid full time members of staff’ (Interview, June 9th, 2011).   
Source Alternative Revenue Streams 
During the 2013/14 season Hamburger SV’s experienced an increase in revenue of €14m to 
€135m (HSV, Annual Accounts, 2014).  Their recent league positions have meant that the club 
would not compete in European competitions resulting in a drop in TV and gate receipt income 
in recent seasons.  Matchday revenue represented the most important revenue stream to the 
football business with 37% coming from this source (Deloitte, 2014).  HSV’s commercial 
revenues are supported by an extended deal with shirt sponsor Emirates, running until 2014/15 
and the six year stadium naming rights deal with Imtech, worth a reported €4.2m (£3.8m) per 
season through to the 2015/16 season (Deloitte, 2014).  In addition, the club have secured a 
deal with a wealthy local businessman in the logistics industry.  As Jens Wagner stated this was 
not to the liking of the members as it went against the philosophy of the football club by 
pursuing external private investment.  Jens explains that the deal was ‘for €15 million Kuehne 
Logistics gets the transfer rights of 30% of five players.  So that means if we sell a player for 
€20 million then he will get €6 million back as his return on his investment’ (Interview, June 9, 
2011).  HSV’s commercial operations underpin the club’s alternative revenue strategy and have 
remained fairly resilient to the club’s on-pitch difficulties.   
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External Stakeholder Pressure  
During the 2013/2014 season the mutual philosophy of the football club came under internal 
scrutiny and intense pressure once more.  In Autumn 2013, several wealthy HSV member’s 
announced that they were willing to invest to boost the playing budget.  In return they stipulated 
that they wanted the professional football department to be ‘spun-off‘ and were sold 24.9% of 
it’s equity capital.  As Oli Scheel explained ‘Their reasoning centred on HSV reforming to a 
more professional structure to become more competitive.  Their frustrations had built up over 
several seasons of poor League finishes.  Obviously this proposal of investment and their 
demands did not embrace the democratic culture within the club’ (Telephone Interview, 2nd 
May, 2014).  However, events were to unfold, boosted by a high profile and sophisticated media 
campaign to rally support amongst the members.  The campaign soon gathered momentum to 
put pressure on the mutual structure of the club, the removal of what they saw as ineffective 
governance structures and for the club to ‘spin-off‘ their professional football department into 
a public limited company similar to their rivals Bayern Munich.   
Opinion was divided once more and politically active members loyal to the (e.V.) structure 
launched their own media campaign entitled - HSV Not For Sale (Supporters Direct, 2013 
[online]).  On the pitch, HSV narrowly escaped relegation with a 0-0 draw at home and an 1-1 
draw away against Greuther Fuerth during their final relegation play-off game.  In May 2014, 
an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) was called for members to vote on the proposed 
‘spin-off‘ structure, the intended sale of 24.9% share of the professional football department to 
private investors (anything equalling or over 25% entitles special minority rights for private 
investors) and restucturing of the members’ associations statutes.  A total of 86.9% of the 9,702 
participating members voted in favour and the re-structure was actioned.   
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DISCUSSION 
Evidence showed that HSV were adhering to collective decision making processes, albeit at 
times, being slower and overly bureaucratic.  HSV adhere to democratic decision making across 
their two Boards and held an Annual General Meeting (AGM) and if necessary an Extraordinary 
General Meeting (EGM).  Members of HSV were not found to be involved in key decisions 
relating to the football club (Franck, 2010).  Instead, they were informed and educated about 
the important strategic and operational decisions made by the club through various media 
outputs and the AGM.  HSV reiterated the importance of being seen to be ‘inclusive’ and honest 
and transparent in their approach with their key external stakeholders.  Promoting democratic 
principles should be implemented internally and externally throughout two or more Boards, 
utilising the ‘one member, one vote’ policy and by elections of the Board Members’ appointed 
on the Supervisory Board.   
The Supporters’ Club have to focus on maintaining this mutual empathy among their fan base 
to ensure that the majority are still in favour of the current structure despite the changing 
external environment.  Interestingly, the core of the most politically motivated Supporters’ Club 
members at HSV feel that the ever-growing number of members has resulted in the dilution of 
the Supporters’ Club main philosophical stance. They feel that many fans are joining as 
members to the Supporters’ Club to receive match day benefits and reductions on 
merchandising rather than contribute to the political cause of the Supporters’ Club.  However, 
this large membership number does have a financial advantage and creates a feeling within the 
club of political power (Vidovich & Currie, 2012; Wajeeh & Muneeza, 2012).  The Supporters’ 
Club have been able to raise the club’s credibility and gain the respect from HSV’s external 
stakeholders due to the way they have gone about promoting their business since becoming part 
of the club in 1992.  Lucrative sponsorship deals have been attracted by the large membership 
HSV had in place and the exposure this would bring to their brands. 
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This research also highlighted the principal disadvantages, which were primarily in relation to 
decision-making, competitive advantage and finance.  A common problem identified within 
HSV was the inability of some voluntary Board members to cope with the amount of work 
required of them (Brown, Hillman, Okun, 2011).  The Supervisory Board were found to have a 
proportion of Directors who were retired, however, a large proportion of Board members were 
in full time employment or were self-employed.  Consequently, many of the Supervisory Board 
members were working full time during the day in their paid role and then dealing with football 
club matters during their lunchtime, after work or at weekends.   
The nature of sport and in particular football is that the results on the pitch will always be the 
paramount concern for all involved at the club (Reid & Turbide, 2011).  The philosophy of the 
Supporters’ Club is to try and achieve this aspiration on the pitch without jeopardising the 
financial future of the club.  These differing viewpoints coupled with a rise of what could only 
be described as an ‘arms race’ by the majority of football clubs to gain this success will always 
result in tensions (McDonald & Sherry, 2010).  What has become apparent from the findings is 
the difficulty of the HSV’s Supporters’ Club  to rally support for their viewpoint and educate 
fans to share and understand their ethos, particularly, with inconsistent form on the pitch.  
Inevitably, the lack of success on the pitch over the past few seasons as well as the narrow 
prevention of relegation has placed intense internal and external pressure on the historic 
ownership model at HSV.  Over a 23-year period since 1992, the Supporters’ Club at HSV has 
managed to survive several attempts to follow their Bundesliga competitors in restructuring to 
attract private investment.  Unfortunately, with the recent rise of other German football clubs 
(operating with a ‘spun-off’ professional football department) enjoying domestic and European 
success Borussia Dortmund and Bayern Munich) it has placed fierce scrutiny on the overall 
structure of HSV.   
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A contributory factor in the end could have been the pursuit for a large membership and the 
offer of attractive rewards in return for their subscriptions.  Where members only joining for 
these rewards or were they wanting to join the political core of the Supporters’ Club who truly 
embraced the ethos and philosophy of HSV?  It can be surmised that the large membership 
HSV boasts did include a high percentage of politically uneducated fans within the club.  The 
recent members meeting in May 2014, received a record attendance of 9,702 members 
participating to vote.  The members’ association still has 75.1% control of the ‘spun-off’ 
professional football department and want to continue with the same superordinate structure.   
CONCLUSION 
This paper examined literature on nonprofit governance and sport governance, which has 
demonstrated that sport governance research has begun to address critical environmental issues 
such as challenges to decision making, the demands of multiple stakeholders, the changing 
environment and Board leadership.  A consideration of the mature bodies of knowledge in the 
corporate and nonprofit governance literature as well as selected aspects of organisation theory 
highlights relevant theoretical influences for football contexts.  These influences focus on 
concerns around ownership and control of corporations and probe issues such as manager 
dominance and control of the shareholder interests.  National sport organisations too are 
grappling with the growing dominance of management involvement in governance, signalling 
a potential retreat by volunteer Board members who have traditionally been elected to protect 
the interests of membership.  Naturally, an incoming CEO of a football club will be interested 
in the commercial basis of the sport and will look to opportunities to generate revenue to sustain 
and develop existing and new programs.  The CEO inexperienced with the sport environment 
might not be able to balance commercial interests against the interests of the membership at 
large, which includes the way in which strategic decisions are made.  If, as the literature 
suggests, volunteer Board members are ceding control to paid professionals, this potentially 
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leaves the interests of the membership-at-large, unattended.  The nonprofit literature has also 
helped identify the additional complexity faced by nonprofit Boards in achieving organisational 
outcomes.    
Interestingly, the literature review of the German model highlighted that prior to 1998, German 
football clubs were structured as pure members’ associations, which was a structure all the 
clubs had adopted from formation.  However, through growing pressure amongst the football 
clubs that this structure was limiting their ability to successfully compete on the pitch and 
against their European counterparts’ legislation was revised.  Since these revisions, German 
football has seen the introduction of the ‘50+1’ rule which still protects the ethos of football 
clubs remaining under the ownership of supporters but has enhanced the ability of the football 
club to attract outside investors.  German football clubs have experienced limited willingness 
of investors and have not seen the rise of foreign owners wanting to be involved in the 
Bundesliga due to the ‘50+1’ rule preventing them becoming the majority shareholder.  As with 
all regulations several clubs, have found loopholes in the system or have received special 
dispensations to pursue alternative financial arrangements.  In reality, several German clubs 
have decided to ‘spin-off’ their football business in order to make investment more attractive.   
Recommended future research would be to provide further qualitative studies to the academic 
field pertaining to mutuality within football.  In particular, more studies are needed in similar 
sized clubs to HSV in Europe adopting the mutual model such as Real Madrid FC and Barcelona 
FC (Hamil, Walters & Watson, 2010).  To further enhance our understanding of German 
football and their structures additional qualitative studies focusing on the different supporter 
ownership structures in operation in the Bundesliga would be extremely beneficial to the 
academic field.  Findings from such studies would provide detailed insights of other business 
models in existence which still encompass supporter ownership or supporter control.  
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